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PUBLIC LAW
power over municipally owned utilities at the time of the Con-
stitution of 1921; they cite later cases than those cited by the
majority holding that unless the power of rate-fixing is express-
ly given to municipalities, they do not have that power.4 Since
the City of Monroe does not have clear rate-fixing power, dis-
senters conclude it cannot have been reserved to them under Ar-
ticle VI, Section 7, of the Constitution. They note also that the
Constitution treats rate-fixing by the Louisiana Public Service
Commission separate and apart from supervision and control and
that reservation of the latter alone cannot reserve the rate-fixing
power unless it has been specifically granted in charter or
statute.5
Either literal interpretation of the Monroe charter, of course,
has plausibility; hence, the issue might have been resolved more
clearly on the basis of the policy decision seemingly made when
a constitution was adopted providing for state-wide rate-fixing
powers in the Louisiana Public Service Commission ;6 this step
would seem to have been clearly a decision in favor of commis-
sion powers rather than municipal power generally and would
seem a basis for resolving a close problem of statutory and con-
stitutional interpretation such as is here involved in favor of,
rather than against, commission rate-fixing authority.7
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
(EXCLUSIVE OF INCOME TAX)
Charles A. Reynard*
Twelve of the cases decided by the court at the past term
raised issues in the field of taxation. Four of these involved the
state's income tax and are treated in a separate section of this
symposium.' Three others posed constitutional issues and are
4. People's Gas & Fuel Co. v, Louisiana Public Service Commission, 177 La.
722, 149 So. 435 (1932) ; Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 151 La.
864, 92 So. 365 (1922).
5. 233 La. 478, 534, 536, 97 So.2d 56, 77, 78 (1957).
6. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 et seq.
7. Dissenting Justices rely particularly on the court's statement in Shreveport
v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 151 La. 864, 870, 92 So. 365, 367 (1956) :
"Indeed, this power compulsorily to impose rates being a high attribute of sov-
ereignty, not particularly needed by municipalities for properly functioning, and
not usually delegated to them, its delegation could not well be held to have resulted
unless from such terms as were positive or absolutely unmistakable."
*Late Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Collector of Revenue v. King Lumber Industries, 233: La. '965, 99 So.2d
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discussed in the section devoted to that subject.2 The remaining
five cases, discussed here, concerned ad valorem, franchise, in-
heritance, occupational license and sales taxation, and will be
discussed in that order.
AD VALOREM TAXATION
In one of the frequently recurring situations in which the
validity of tax sales of real property is called in question, the
court held in Mansfield Lumber Company v. Butlera that clerical
errors committed in the course of preparing the assessment roll
will not invalidate the tax sale. Here the plaintiff brought a
petitory action seeking recognition as owner and possession of
certain contiguous tracts of land. It was clearly established that
Plaintiff's title was derived from a tax sale and the conveyance
pursuant to that sale formed a link in an unbroken chain of title
back to the United States Government. The defendant con-
tended, however, that as to one portion of the land in question,
no assessment had been made for the tax year in question, a
claim which was supported by the assessment roll. However, ref-
erence to the assessment sheet used in compiling the assessments
for the year in question clearly showed that the land was subject
to assessment and fully described it, thereby demonstrating that
the error had occurred in the course of transcribing the informa-
tion to the assessment roll. Since the roll showed the total cor-
rect acreage, of which the contested portion was but a part, and
correctly reflected the total amount of taxes due, the court re-
fused to permit the clerical error to invalidate the tax sale. Sim-
ilar clerical errors in the assessment roll respecting other parcels
resulting in alleged dual assessment were likewise held not to
have invalidated the tax sale. Although Article 10, Section 11,
of the State Constitution provides that sales of property for
taxes may "be set aside on proof of payment of the taxes for
which the property was sold," the clerical errors resulting in the
dual assessments in this case made it clear that the taxes paid
310 (1958) ; Olvey v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 985, 99 So.2d 317 (1958) ;
Collector of Revenue v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 234 La. 587, 100 So.2d 876
(1958); and Schlesinger v. Collector of Revenue, 235 La. 47, 102 So.2d 488
(1958).
2. Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 600, 97 So.2d
409 (1957); Ewell v. Bd. of Supvrs. of L.S.U., 234 La. 419, 100 So.2d 221
(1958); and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La.
651, 101 So.2d 70 (1958).
3. 234 La.'322, 99 So.2d 129 (1958).
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by others were actually paid for different parcels which had been
erroneously described by the error.
FRANCHISE TAXATION
In the franchise tax case, Continental Oil Co. v. Collector of
Revenue,4 the court sustained the right of the Collector to revise
the amount of the surplus account of the corporate taxpayer for
purposes of assessing the franchise tax. In this case it was held
that intangible drilling and development costs incurred by an
oil producer are properly to be regarded as assets, rather than
expenses in computing the tax. The decision is a reasonable and
fairminded construction of the statutory power of the Collec-
tor5 and accords with prior jurisprudence."
INHERITANCE TAXATION
In Succession of Martin7 arising under the provisions of the
state's inheritance tax, it was held that where a testamentary
legatee dies prior to the time inheritance taxes on the gifts to
him have been determined and without having actually received
his inheritance, the gift which would have been his, and which
thereby passes to his heirs, is not subject to an inheritance tax
as a part of his estate. There is superficially persuasive support
for the position of the tax collector in such a case based upon
the commonly accepted thesis that the inheritance tax is based
upon the right to inherit. In keeping with that concept, which
was fully acknowledged by the court in the instant case, the
legatee acquires the unquestioned right to the property notwith-
standing the fact that his untimely death precludes his actual
enjoyment of the property. Furthermore, it is conceded that his
title enables him to transmit the property to others by testa-
mentary disposition or intestacy at his death. However, the
court has consistently distinguished between seisin of right and
seisin in fact, and applying the distinction to the facts of this
case, it concluded that the legatee's failure to succeed to actual
physical possession and enjoyment of the donation during his
lifetime barred the application of the inheritance tax. The case
accords with a substantial line of precedent cited by the court.
4. 104 So.2d 633 (La. 1958).
5. LA. R.S. 47:605A (1950).
6. National Manufacture & Stores Corp. v. Collector, 86 So.2d 238 (La. App.
1956).




In New Orleans v. Forsyth8 the city sought to collect occupa-
tional license taxes from an individual engaged in the illegal
activity of selling lottery tickets. Conceding that the state had
not specifically taxed the occupation in question - a condition
precedent to occupational license taxation by municipalities 9 -
the city contended that the tax was due under the omnibus clause
applying to all occupations not otherwise specifically enumer-
ated. Considerable reliance was placed by both parties upon the
case of Giamalva v. Cooperl0 where the court in 1950 had sus-
tained an act of the legislature imposing a very substantial tax
upon the business of operating slot machines-a similarly illegal
activity. The court rejected the city's thesis on two grounds.
In the first place it construed the legislature's special slot ma-
chine tax to indicate an intent that the occupational license taxes
are to be applied only to lawful activities. In the second place,
and corroborative of this thesis, the court cited legislative pro-
visions relating to the enforcement of the occupational license
tax which authorize judgments "prohibiting the taxpayer from
the further pursuit of the business until such time as he has
paid the delinquent tax."" Although the result is unquestion-
ably sound and very probably conforms to legislative intent, the
casual observer must have some sympathy for the city's attempt.
Taxes are, after all, the contribution one makes toward the cost
of government; and governmental costs are necessarily increased
by those engaged in illegal activities. It seems fundamentally
unjust that one contributing to increasing cost of government
should escape taxation of his illegal enterprise while honest,
unoffending, and law-abiding businessmen pay the price for ap-
prehending him.
SALES TAXATION
An interesting point of sales tax law was settled in Claiborne
Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue12 where it was concluded that
a company selling ceramic tile to contractors and subcontractors
who used the materials in fulfilling construction contracts was
making "retail sales" and hence became liable for the tax on all
8. 233 La. 981, 99 So.2d 316 (1957).
9. LA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
10. 217 La. 979, 47 So.2d 790 (1950).
11. LA. R.S. 47:401 (1950).
12. 233 La. 1061, 99 So.2d 345 (1957).
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such sales. In cases involving this problem of sales of building
materials the courts of last resort in the several states have been
divided on the point,13 and the issue had never been resolved
under the language of the present Louisiana act. 14 Since the
purchaser of such materials is not the final consumer of the
goods, and simply incorporates them into the building or other
structure he is constructing, some courts have concluded that
the transaction is not a sale at retail, but for resale and as such
not within the reach of the sales tax. Other courts, reaching the
same conclusion as that in the principal case, reason that the
contractor is the last person to make use of the materials in the
form of tangible, movable property and conclude that the sale
is taxable. The Louisiana act amply supports the conclusion
reached here by defining the term "retail sale" to mean "a sale
to a consumer or any other person for any purpose other than a
resale in the form of tangible personal property.""
STATE INCOME TAXATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Fontenot v. King Lumber Industries,' the collector sought
to tax as capital gain on liquidation under La. R.S. 47:159C2 the
excess in value of assets in a subsidiary Louisiana corporation
over the initial value of the stock therein when the subsidiary
was created by its Mississippi parent. The capital gain on liqui-
dation was urged to be taxable in Louisiana, although received
by an out-of-state corporation, on the authority of La. R.S.
47:159H,3 which provides that the situs of the stock in a cor-
13. See Annot., 163 A.L.R. 276 (1946).
14. In State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1935), a
case arising under the provisions of the occupational license tax, a similar result
was reached on comparable facts.
15. LA. R.S. 47:301(10) (1950).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 233 La. 965, 99 So.2d 310 (1957).
2. LA. R.S. 47:159C (1950) : "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of
a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and
amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in
part or full payment in exchange for stock. The gain or loss to the distributee
resulting from such exchange shall be determined under R.S. 47:131 but shall be
recognized only to the extent provided in R.S. 47:132 through 47:138 ....
3. LA. R.S. 47:159H (1950) : "In cases where property located in Louisiana
is received by a shareholder in the liquidation of a corporation, the stock cancelled
or redeemed in the liquidation shall, for purposes of determining taxable gain
under this Chapter, be deemed to have its taxable situs in this state to the extent
that the property of the corporation distributed in liquidation is located in Loul-
1959]
